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PROPOSED SEC REGULATION OF MARKET SWEEPS:
SHOULD MARKET SWEEPS BE GOVERNED BY THE
WILLIAMS ACT?
INTRODUCTION
Mergers and acquisitions' continue to dominate the dynamic "big-
bucks" transactions on Wall Street and throughout corporate America.2
Financial analysts have advanced numerous theories to explain why
mergers and acquisitions have increased in number and frequency, in-
cluding reduced antitrust enforcement, 3 growth of the junk bond4 mar-
ket, and deregulation of the securities industry.5
Acquisition of a controlling interest in a company may be accom-
plished through a variety of methods, including proxy contests, 6 tender
offers,7 and market sweeps.8 Proxy contests and tender offers currently
1. An acquisition is a "union of two businesses into one corporate structure." See A.
Frey, J. Choper, N. Leech & C. Morris, Cases and Materials on Corporations 1281 (2d
ed. 1977). A merger is considered a type of acquisition involving the "union of [two]
corporate entities" into one corporate structure. Id at 1281-82.
2. Merger and acquisition activity has risen dramatically throughout the 1980's. In
1980, 1,565 transactions were conducted, totalling approximately $33 billion. See 1986
Profile, Mergers & Acquisitions, May/June 1987, at 57. By 1986, the total number of
merger transactions had risen to 4,024, totalling over $190 billion. Id.
3. See Greenfield & Weininger, Regulators Widen Options In Weighing Mergers,
Mergers & Acquisitions, Spring 1985, at 55. "In 1982, under an administration avowedly
more sympathetic to mergers than its predecessors, the Justice Department finally buried
the 1968 guidelines and issued a new set that more accurately reflected the department's
actual enforcement stance." 1d.; see also Rhoades, The Decline and Possible Resurrection
ofAntitrust Policy Toward Mergers, 17 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 49, 49-50 (1985) (listing
five major reasons for the rise of the promerger view and the accompanying decline of the
proantitrust position).
4. A junk bond, a bond with a highly speculative credit rating, is a popular means of
financing a takeover. See J. Downes & J. Goodman, Dictionary of Finance and Invest-
ment Terms 199 (2d ed. 1987); L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 500
(1988). The junk bond market has grown to $125 billion dollars, or 20% of all traded
corporate debt. Willoughby, Junkyard Analyst, Forbes, Nov. 2, 1987, at 230.
5. See Roundtable: The Mergers and Acquisitions Outlook for 1987, Mergers & Ac-
quisitions, May/June 1987, at 26-43.
Merger activity should continue, even after the October 1987 stock market crash, be-
cause of lower stock prices and increased foreign buying of United States' companies,
spurred by the weak dollar. See The Hunt for M&A Bargains, Mergers & Acquisitions,
Jan./Feb. 1988, at 9-10.
6. See e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406, 407 (N.D. Ill.),
aff'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). In a proxy contest, the
acquiring entity tries "to persuade the shareholders of the TARGET COMPANY that
the present management of the firm should be ousted in favor of a slate of directors
favorable to the acquirer." J. Downes & J. Goodman, supra note 4, at 313. If the share-
holders vote in favor of the candidates of the acquiring entity, it gains control of the
company without purchasing shares. See id
7. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 884-85 (6th Cir. 1986); see
also infra text accompanying notes 12-17 (defining tender offer).
8. A market sweep entails large block purchases of stock through open-market or
privately negotiated transactions. See Blanc, Commission Proposes to Outlaw Market
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are regulated by federal law.9
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act")1  protects share-
holders by requiring companies engaged in a proxy contest-the tradi-
tional takeover technique prior to the advent of tender offers-to give
shareholders information about their plans for the acquired company."
In the 1960's, bidders began to use tender offers to gain controlling inter-
ests in corporations. A cash tender offer, now considered a conventional
method of carrying out a corporate takeover battle, 2 typically entails a
bid by a person 3 to buy shares of a company, usually at a premium
price. 14  Those persons accepting the offer tender their stock for
purchase. 5 If the conditions specified at the outset by the bidder are
met, 16 he must buy all the tendered shares he obligated himself to
purchase. 7
Sweeps, 10 Nat'l L.J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 29, col. 1; see, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM
Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1985).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (1982) (regulation of proxy contests); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d) (1982) (regulation of tender offers).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2811, 2812-13.
12. See L. Loss, supra note 4, at 497-98; see, e.g., Maynard Oil Co. v. Deltec
Panamerica S.A., 630 F. Supp. 502, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Avalon Corporation made a
tender offer of $6.00 per share for all outstanding Maynard shares); Corchado, Neoax to
Buy IU International for $671 Million, Wall St. J., March 7, 1988, at 6, col. 1 (Neoax
made a tender offer of $17.50 a share and later increased the bid to $22.25, eventually
gaining control of the company); Freedman & Johnson, E-II Holdings to be Acquired for
$L1 Billion, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 3, col. 1 (to defeat E-II Holdings' tender offer,
American Brands made a counter offer of $17.05 for E-II Holding shares-a "Pac-Man"
defense).
13. Section 13(d)(3) of the Williams Act defines "person" as including "two or more
persons [who] act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(2) (1982).
14. See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations 1562 (1980);
Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams); Note, The Developing Meaning of
"Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250, 1251
(1973). A "premium" is the amount by which the tender offer price exceeds market
value. J. Downes & J. Goodman, supra note 4, at 300-01.
15. See sources cited supra note 14.
16. See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 1562; see, e.g., Maynard Oil Co. v.
Deltec Panamerica S.A., 630 F. Supp. 502, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (tender offer for May-
nard shares conditioned on tender of a minimum number of shares, at a specific price,
and by an expiration date); N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1987, at D13, col. 4 (in tender offer
announcement, Ivanhoe Partners conditioned the offer on receiving sufficient financing
and a minimum of 28 million shares tendered); Wall St. J., May 26, 1987, at 45, col. 4 (in
tender offer announcement, Morgan Stanley conditioned the offer on actually receiving a
majority of the outstanding shares tendered and the purchaser entering into certain fi-
nancing agreements).
17. See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 1562 (bidder need not purchase
shares exceeding the number specified in the offer); see also sources cited supra note 14.
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This increased use of cash tender offers placed a substantial number of
corporate control battles beyond the reach of the disclosure requirements
of the 1934 Act. 8 In 1968, Congress passed the Williams Act19 to pro-
vide consistent disclosure under the 1934 Act to shareholders facing
tender offers, whether exchange or cash, that involve securities subject to
registration under the 1934 Act.20 The Williams Act also includes a pro-
vision regulating significant accumulations of shares through open-mar-
ket purchases.21
Although the Williams Act regulates to varying degrees both open-
market purchases and tender offers, the Act does not effectively regulate
market sweeps.22 Market sweeps-purchases of large blocks of stock in
either the open market or through privately negotiated transactions in a
relatively short period of time23-may be used to acquire or retain a con-
trolling interest in a company engaged in a takeover battle.2" Because the
Williams Act fails to regulate market sweeps effectively, shareholders
lack the protections the Act guarantees in the case of tender offers.25
In an effort to provide the shareholder protections intended by the
Williams Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has
proposed Rules 13e-2, 14d-11(a), and 14d-l1(b) under the 1934 Act to
regulate market sweeps. 26 The proposed rules require all purchases, of-
18. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1985); Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 817-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248,
1250-51 (W.D. Okla. 1972); 113 Cong. Rec. 854-55 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams,
sponsor of the Williams Act). Prior to enactment in 1968, the Act did not regulate cash
tender offers except for a general antifraud provision. See L. Loss, supra note 4, at 498;
H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2812-13. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
19. See Securities-Corporate Equity Ownership-Disclosure (Williams) Act, Pub. L
No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)).
20. Williams Act, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a),(b),(g) (1982); see H.R. Rep. No. 1711,
supra note 11, at 2812-13 (bill seeks to help maintain honest securities markets and to
ensure that public investors have truthful information on which to make investment deci-
sions). For relevant statutory language, see infra notes 53-76.
21. See Williams Act, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982); L. Loss, supra note 4, 514-
15 (discussing § 13(d)(1)(A)-(E) and 13(d)(2)). For the statutory language, see infra note
71.
22. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
23. See Blanc, supra note 8, at 29, col. 1.
24. See Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-24976, 52 Fed. Reg.
37,472, 37,474 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240) (proposed Oct. 7, 1987) [herein-
after SEC Release]; Blanc, supra note 8, at 29, col. 1; see, eg., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM
Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1985) (Hanson acquired 3.1 million SCM shares in two
hours to obtain 25% interest).
25. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,475.
26. See id. at 37,474. At an open meeting on September 16, 1987, the SEC, by a four-
to-one vote, approved the recommendation of the SEC's Divisions of Corporation and
Finance Market Regulation, in which the Enforcement Division and the General Coun-
cil's Office concurred, to issue a release proposing Rules 13e-2 and 14d-I I under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and soliciting comment on them. The SEC requested
that all comments be delivered by December 7, 1987. The Division of Corporate Finance
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fers, arrangements or understandings to purchase, and all solicitations of
offers to sell securities undertaken during or shortly after a tender offer to
comply with the statutory provisions and rules applicable to tender of-
fers2 7 if the purchases would increase any person's ownership of a class of
securities subject to the tender offer by ten percent or more of that
class.28
This Note examines whether the class of transactions known as market
sweeps needs to be regulated, and, if so, whether the SEC's proposed
rules would effectively regulate such transactions. Part I discusses the
harms caused by unregulated tender offers and the elimination of such
harms through passage of the Williams Act. Part II explains how mar-
ket sweeps have evaded the protections of the Williams Act and demon-
strates the need to adopt remedial provisions, drawing an analogy
between the damage caused by unregulated tender offers prior to passage
of the Williams Act and that inflicted by market sweeps. Part III in-
troduces the SEC's proposed regulation of market sweeps and analyzes
its benefits and shortcomings. This Note concludes that promulgation of
the SEC proposal, with some modifications, is necessary to prevent inves-
tors from using market sweeps to circumvent the laudable intentions of
the Williams Act.
I. THE WILLIAMS ACT
Prior to amendment by the Williams Act29 , the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934'0 did not regulate cash tender offers in a way "remotely
comparable" to proxy regulation. 3 During this period, a person or a
corporation desiring to purchase a number of shares of stock of a particu-
lar company offered shareholders a set price, typically at a premium, for
their shares through a tender offer.3 2 The offeror, who could remain
anonymous, 33 then purchased the shares on a first-come, first-served ba-
sis, terminating the offer after purchasing the desired number of shares.34
will review the solicited comments and submit a final proposal to the Commission, which
will conduct an open meeting to consider the final proposal.
27. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,473; For relevant proposed language, see
infra notes 149-50, 157.
28. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,473 & n.4.
29. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
31. See L. Loss, supra note 4, at 498; H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2812.
The only regulations of cash tender offers prior to 1968 were the fraud provision of § lob-
5 and the insider trading provision of § 16. L. Loss, supra note 4, at 498.
32. See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 1563; H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra
note 11, at 2811; 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams); see, e.g.,
sources cited supra note 12.
33. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2812; 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967) (state-
ment of Sen. Williams). In addition, an unregulated tender offer permitted any person
who made a tender offer to keep any plans to gain corporate control and future manage-
ment plans from the shareholders of the corporation. Id.; see also L. Loss, supra note 4,
at 498.
34. See sources cited supra note 32.
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Use of a tender offer enabled the purchaser to gain a controlling interest
in the company without first notifying shareholders. a5 During the
1960's, the growth of cash tender offers as a method of gaining corporate
control3 6 led to recognition of the harms caused by such unregulated
transactions and to passage of the Williams Act to eliminate these
harms.3 7
A. Harms Of Unregulated Tender Offers
Unregulated tender offers inflicted various harms on shareholders and
target companies. The absence of regulation permitted bidders to con-
duct tender offers covertly, 8 a practice that contradicted the open nature
of American securities markets established by the Securities Exchange
Acts of 1933 and 1934.39 These covert corporate acquisition attempts
unfairly blinded target companies and shareholders, depriving them of
the ability to protect their interests properly."°
The 1934 Act did not require a person seeking corporate control
through a tender offer to disclose any information about his background,
motives, or plans.41 This lack of information handicapped target com-
pany shareholders in making decisions whether to tender their shares
because, without the information, they could not evaluate the compe-
tence or sincerity of the bidding party.42 Furthermore, the first-come,
first-served purchase policy pressured shareholders into making quick
decisions to sell because they faced the risk that the offeror would termi-
nate the offer before they could tender their shares. 3 At the same time,
however, the possibility that the bidder might raise the offered price pres-
sured shareholders to delay tendering their shares." Moreover, the first-
come, first-served policy treated shareholders unequally because those
who tendered quickly could sell all their shares, while other shareholders
35. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2813.
36. See 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams); H.R. Rep. No. 1711,
supra note 11, at 2812.
37. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2812-14; infra notes 38-77 and accom-
panying text.
38. See 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967) ("persons seeking control in these ways are able to
operate in almost complete secrecy concerning their intentions, their commitments and
even their identities") (statement of Sen. Williams).
39. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2813-14. The secrecy of unregulated
tender offers was "inconsistent with the disclosure pattern generally prevailing in the
American securities markets." 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 12,676, 10 SEC Docket 143, 145 (Aug. 2,
1976).
40. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1985); Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 817-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
41. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2812; 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967) (state-
ment of Sen. Williams).
42. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2812; Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 822.
43. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2812.
44. See id.
1988]
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might not be able to tender any.45 Last, the lack of disclosure require-
ments gave the bidder an advantage over the target company, which had
no data or information with which to evaluate the offer and react
accordingly.46
B. Tender Offer Provisions of the Williams Act
In reaction to the harms implicit in unregulated tender offers, Con-
gress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 through passage of
the Williams Act.47 Section 14(d) of the Williams Act deals specifically
with tender offers,48 while section 13(d) establishes posttransaction re-
porting requirements for open-market purchases in which investors ac-
quire more than five percent of a company's outstanding shares.49
Congress, by separating sections 14(d) and 13(d), distinguished between
purchases for corporate control made through tender offers and large
stock accumulations made through open-market purchases. 50
The Williams Act resolves most of the problems generated by an un-
regulated tender offer,51 thus closing a gap in federal securities regula-
tion.2  Section 14(d)(1) of the Williams Act 53 removes the information
45. See id. ("if [the shareholder] tenders late, he runs the risk that none of his shares
will be taken").
46. See 113 Cong. Rec. 854-55 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams); see also Full Dis-
closure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S.
510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1967) (statement of Mr. Kahler, secretary and general counsel of
the International Silver Co.) (explaining that some tender offers or covert purchases may
be used to destroy a target company).
47. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2813-14; 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967)
(statement of Sen. Williams); Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir.
1985); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d
355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2820.
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982); see also Note, Defensive Stock Repurchase Pro-
grams: Tender Offers in Need of Regulation, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 535, 540 (1986).
50. See 113 Cong. Rec. 855-56 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams); Note, supra note
49, at 540.
51. See generally M. Rock, The Mergers and Acquisitions Handbook 421 (1987); B.
Wasserstein, Corporate Finance Law; A Guide for the Executive 234 (1978); Note, The
Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer", supra note 14, at 1257.
52. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2814.
53. Section 14(d)(1) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly .... to make a tender
offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders of, any class of any equity secur-
ity which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or any equity security
of an insurance company which would have been required to be so registered
except for the exemption contained in section 781(g)(2)(G) of this title, or any
equity security issued by a a [sic] closed-end investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ... if, after consummation thereof,
such person would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5
per centum of such class, unless at the time copies of the offer or request or
invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders such person has
filed with the Commission a statement containing such of this information ...
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barrier inherent in an unregulated tender offer' by requiring any party
making a tender offer for more than five percent of a company's securi-
ties that are registered with the SEC pursuant to section 12 of the 1934
Act55 to disclose certain relevant information prior to, or concurrent
with, the commencement of the offer, including the bidder's identity, the
purpose of the tender offer, and his means of financing the offer. 6 This
requirement provides shareholders with the means to evaluate the offer.5"
The Williams Act also reduces the time pressure placed on sharehold-
ers by an unregulated tender offer.5 SEC regulation requires a tender
offer to remain open for a minimum of twenty business days, 59 guaran-
teeing shareholders reasonable time to decide whether to tender their
shares.' ° In addition, section 14(d)(5) permits shareholders who tender
as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
Under § 14(d)(1), the tender offeror must file the same information as required by
§ 13(d). See 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(d)(1) (1982). Section 13(d)(1) requires tender offerors to
supply:
(A) [T]he background, and identity, residence, and citizenship of, and the
nature of such beneficial ownership by, such person and all other persons by
whom or on whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected;
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be
used in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price is repre-
sented or is to be represented by funds or other consideration borrowed or
otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or trading such secur-
ity, a description of the transaction and the names of the parties thereto... ;
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire
control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals
which such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or
merge it with any other persons, or to make any other major change in its
business or corporate structure;
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned, and
the number of shares concerning which there is a right to acquire, directly or
indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate of such person, giving
the background, identity, residence, and citizenship of each such associate;, and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with
any person with respect to any securities of the issuer .... naming the persons
with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings have been entered
into, and giving the details thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (1982).
54. See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1985); S-G
Secs., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1123-24 (D. Mass. 1978).
55. Williams Act, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
57. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2814; Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM
Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1985); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 822
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
58. See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1985); Cattle-
men's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
59. Rule 14e-1 provides in pertinent part that "no person who makes a tender offer
shall ... [h]old such tender offer open for less than twenty business days from the date
such tender offer is first published or sent or given to security holders." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-1 (1987).
60. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 33-6618, 51 Fed. Reg.,
19881
804 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
their shares to withdraw them during the first seven days of the tender
offer or at any time after sixty days from the commencement of the offer,
provided the offeror has not yet purchased the shares."' This provision
allows shareholders the opportunity to change their decision to tender if
presented with a more attractive option.62 Section 14(d)(6) prevents the
first-come, first-served policy by requiring the bidder to purchase ten-
dered shares on a pro rata basis if the initial tender offer is for less than
all outstanding shares.63 This eliminates the risk that some shareholders
will be closed out before they can tender their shares. Last, section
14(d)(7) mandates that all tendering shareholders receive the same price
for their shares, even if the offeror later increases the offering price, guar-
anteeing all shareholders the highest price offered.' 4
No. 15, at 3031-32 (Jan. 23, 1986); see also Tyson, The Williams Act After Hanson Trust
PLC v. SCM Corporation: Post-Tender Offer Purchases by the Tender Offeror, 61 Tul. L.
Rev. 1, 5 (1986) (Congress' goals included providing "sufficient time to evaluate [rele-
vant] information so that [a shareholder] would be in a position to respond adequately to
an offer.").
61. Section 14(d)(5) provides:
Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for ten-
ders may be withdrawn by or on behalf of the depositor at any time until the
expiration of seven days after the time definitive copies of the offer or request or
invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders, and at any
time after sixty days from the date of the original tender offer or request or
invitation, except as the Commission may otherwise prescribe by rules, regula-
tions, or order as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
62. Shareholders may be presented with tender offers from competing bidders. See,
e.g., Sease, Industrials Ease as Profit-Taking and Program Trading Brake Rally, Wall St.
J., Mar. 10, 1988, at 51, col. 2 (R.H. Macy Co. and Campeau Corp. launch competing
tender offers for Federated Dep't Stores). The shareholders' ability to revoke their ten-
ders leaves shareholders with the chance to respond to a move by the target company to
retain control. For example, the target company may provide a dividend as part of a
restructuring program used to compete against a hostile tender offer. See, e.g., Ivanhoe
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1339-40 (Del.), aff'g, 533 A.2d 585
(Del. Ch. 1987).
63. Section 14(d)(6) provides in pertinent part:
Where any person makes a tender offer, or request or invitation for tenders, for
less than all the outstanding equity securities of a class, and where a greater
number of securities is deposited pursuant thereto within ten days after copies
of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given to secur-
ity holders than such person is bound or willing to take up and pay for, the
securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may be pro rata, disregarding
fractions, according to the number of securities deposited by each depositor.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
64. Section 14(d)(7) provides in pertinent part:
Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders before the expiration thereof by increasing the consideration offered to
holders of such securities, such person shall pay the increased consideration to
each security holder whose securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders whether or not such securities
have been taken up by such person before the variation of the tender offer or
request or invitation.
MARKET SWEEPS
Thus, the Williams Act ensures equal and fair treatment of the target
company's shareholders.65 By guaranteeing all shareholders the rights to
withdraw,66 to have their shares purchased on a pro rata basis,6' and to
receive the highest price offered,68 sections 14(d)(5) through 14(d)(7) en-
sure that no shareholder receives a better offer than any other share-
holder, regardless of when they tender their shares.69
In addition to regulating tender offers, the Williams Act contains pro-
visions applicable to open-market purchases. 0 Section 13(d) of the Act
establishes a posttransaction filing requirement that guarantees the dis-
semination of relevant information with respect to any large accumula-
tion of stock71 without substantially disrupting the buying and selling of
such securities on the open market.72
In enacting sections 14(d) and 13(d) to protect shareholders, Congress
guarded against "tipping the balance" of regulation either in favor of
incumbent management or in favor of the party making the takeover
bid.73 Congress sought to ensure a takeover environment that would be
fair to all parties.74 In addition to the filing requirements section 14(d)(1)
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
The SEC has promulgated rules pursuant to its rule-making authority under § 14(d).
See eg., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1987) ("Scope of and definitions applicable to Regula-
tions 14D and 14E"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1987) ("Date of commencement of a tender
offer"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1987) ("Filing and transmission of tender offer
statement").
65. See Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448, 1453 (5th Cir. 1986).
66. See Williams Act, § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
67. See Williams Act, § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
68. See Williams Act, § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
69. See S-G Secs., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1124 (D. Mass. 1978).
70. See Williams Act, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
71. Section 13(d) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership
of any equity security of a class... is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner
of more than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acqui-
sition, send to the issuer of the security at its principal executive office, by regis-
tered or certified mail, send to each exchange where the security is traded, and
file with the Commission, a statement containing such of the following informa-
tion, and such additional information, as the Commission may by rules and
regulations, prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors ....
Id For the specific information required to be filed, see supra note 53.
The SEC has promulgated rules pursuant to its rule-making authority under section
13(d). See, eg., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-I (1987) ("Filing of Schedules 13D and 13G"); 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-2 (1987) ("Filing of amendments to Schedules 13D or 13G"); 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1987) ("Determination of beneficial owner").
72. The filing may postdate the purchase by ten days. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l)
(1982).
73. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634 (1982); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977); Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1985);
SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1985); Terry v.
Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161, 166-67 (D. Haw. 1986); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note
11, at 2813; 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
74. 113 Cong. Rec. 856 (1967) ("With this legislation, all will stand on an equal foot-
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
imposes upon the tender offeror,75 section 14(d)(4) of the Williams Act
requires the target company to file with the SEC and submit to the bidder
any recommendations it plans to make to its shareholders with respect to
the offer.76 By requiring both the tender offeror and the target company
to provide each other with information regarding their positions, these
provisions place both parties in comparable situations, thus removing
any advantage enjoyed by the offeror."
II. MARKET SWEEPS: A TAKEOVER TACTIC
THAT REMAINS UNREGULATED
Market sweeps recently have been used in corporate takeover battles to
gain controlling interests in target companies. 7 Any of three parties
may employ a market sweep in the context of a takeover battle: the tar-
get company, to retain control; 79 the bidder, to acquire control; 80 or a
third party, often called a "white knight,"'" acting in conjunction with
the target company, to defend the company from the raider's threatened
takeover.8 2
Market sweeps particularly are attractive once a tender offer has been
commenced,83 which by definition includes public announcements made
pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) of the Williams Act.84 Upon public an-
nouncement or commencement of a tender offer through a section 14(d)
ing with respect to the availability of significant facts about a tender offer .... This is the
premise on which our securities markets are supposed to work.") (statement of Sen.
Williams).
75. See supra note 53.
76. Section 14d(4) provides:
Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of such a security to accept
or reject a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders shall be made in
accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1982); see H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2820.
77. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2813.
78. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474; Blanc, supra note 8, at 29; see, e.g.,
Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1985) (Hanson acquired 3.1
million SCM shares in two hours to obtain a 25% interest); SEC Release, supra note 24,
at 37,474 & n.7 (discussing market sweeps by Campeau Corp., Dixons Group plc, and
Cyclops Corp.).
79. See, e.g., SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d 945, 946-47 (9th Cir. 1985).
80. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 50-52 (2d Cir. 1985).
81. A white knight is a "friendly acquirer sought by the target of an unfriendly [take-
over]." J. Downes & J. Goodman, Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 470 (2d
ed. 1987); see L. Loss, supra note 4, at 502.
82. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 589 (Del.
Ch.), aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
83. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,475.
84. A public announcement, as defined in Rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b),
includes announcements to the public that give information on the bidder's identity, the
target company's name, the amount and class of securities sought, the price or price
range, and offers in consideration for the shares, cash or securities exempt from registra-
tion under the Securities Act of 1933. Id.; see also SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,476
n.21.
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filing, market professionals begin assembling blocks of stock, which they
then market to the bidder, target company, and third parties."5 The bid-
der in a takeover battle may refuse to begin an announced tender offer or
may terminate a tender offer already in progress and purchase these
blocks of stock at market price through a quick "market sweep," winning
the takeover battle by circumventing the tender offer process.8 6 Termi-
nation of a tender offer in favor of a market sweep benefits the purchaser
by reducing his cost of gaining corporate control 7 and by giving him the
advantage of surprise over other competitors.88 Although parties may
use either market sweeps or tender offers to achieve the same goal,89
neither section 13(d) nor 14(d) of the Williams Act adequately regulates
market sweeps.90
A. Section 13(d) Fails to Regulate Market Sweeps Effectively
Section 13(d) of the Williams Act regulates open-market purchases,
requiring disclosure of pertinent information within ten days of the ac-
quisition of more than five percent of a company's outstanding securi-
ties. 91 Because market sweeps frequently are completed within ten
days, 92 a purchaser may gain a controlling interest in a company before
the purchaser must meet the disclosure requirements. Therefore, the
postfiling requirements of section 13(d) do not effectively provide share-
holders the protections intended by Congress in passing the Williams
Act.
85. See id. at 37,475.
86. See id.; see, eg., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Hanson Trust terminated its tender offer for SCM shares on Sept. 1 th and performed a
market sweep that same afternoon); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp.
773, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Edper abandoned conditional offer to acquire Brascan and
purchased 3 million shares of Brascan stock on the open market 10 days later).
87. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474; infra notes 135-36 and accompanying
text.
88. See Note, Promoting Shareholder Equality in Stock Accumulation Programs for
Corporate Control, 36 Am. U.L. Rev. 93, 111 (1986); infra note 134 and accompanying
text; cf L. Loss, supra note 4, at 498 (secrecy with which an unregulated tender offer may
be executed enables the offeror to surprise management); W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra
note 14, at 1563 ("the important advantage of surprise is lost by reason of the registration
process").
89. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474. Compare Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 589 (Del. Ch.) (Consolidated Gold Fields ac-
quired a controlling interest in Newmont through a market sweep), aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334
(Del. 1987) with Corchado, Neoax to Buy I. U. International For S671 Million, Wall St. J.,
March 7, 1988, at 6, col. 1 (Neoax used a tender offer to gain eventual control of I.U.
International).
90. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982); supra note 71.
92. See e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1985) (ac-
quired 25% control within two hours); Gold Fields Increases Its Newmont Stake To
Nearly 50%, Appears to Foil Pickens, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1987, at 3, col. 1 (white knight
acting in cooperation with the target purchased 21.5% in only one day).
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B. Market Sweeps Are Not Covered by Section 14(d) Regulations
Parties involved in corporate control battles have challenged market
sweeps performed without prior disclosure to shareholders on the
grounds that the purchases were, in effect, tender offers and therefore
should be subject to the requirements of section 14(d) of the Williams
Act.9 3 They based this argument on the absence of a definition of
"tender offer" in the Williams Act. In enacting section 14(d), Congress
elected not to define the term "tender offer," merely referring to a
"tender offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders of [securities]."9"
This ambiguity, however, left room for arguments that market sweeps
might be considered unconventional tender offers.95
In response to these challenges, courts have established three different
tests to determine whether a market sweep is a tender offer. 96 The first
test, recommended by the SEC, considers the existence of eight factors in
deciding whether a particular transaction is a tender offer.97 This test is
the broadest, focusing on the various characteristics of a tender offer
such as the length and extent of the offer. The second test is a two-
pronged test that examines whether there existed a "publicly announced
intention" to acquire control of a company and a subsequent, rapid
purchase of the target company's stock.98 The final test examines a par-
93. See, e.g., Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,589 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re Paine Webber Jackson & Cur-
tis, Inc., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,310, at 85,695 (Dec.
30, 1982); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1250 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982); see L. Loss, supra note 4, at 518; In re Paine Web-
ber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,3 10, at 85,710 (Dec. 30, 1982); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251
(W.D. Okla. 1972).
95. See, e.g., Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. Il1. 1973); In re Paine Webber Jackson & Cur-
tis, Inc., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,310, at 85,695 (Dec.
30, 1982); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1250 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
96. See Note, supra note 49, at 547; infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
97. The eight factors in deciding whether a market sweep is a tender offer are:
1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of
an issuer; (2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock;
(3) offer to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price;
(4) terms of the offer are firm, rather than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the
tender of a fixed number of shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number to
be purchased; (6) offer open only a limited period of time; (7) offeree subjected
to pressure to sell his stock[;] ... [and (8)] public announcements of a purchas-
ing program concerning the target company precede or accompany rapid ac-
cumulation of large amounts of the target company's securities.
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355
(2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); accord SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale
Stores, 760 F.2d 945, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 823-24);
Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,403, at 93,429 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 1978).
98. The second test, developed in S-G Secs., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp.
1114 (D. Mass. 1978), classifies a market sweep as a tender offer if, first, there is "a
publicly announced intention by the purchaser to acquire a substantial block of the stock
[Vol. 56
MARKET SWEEPS
ticular transaction's impact on the target company's shareholders.99 A
majority of these courts decline to classify market sweeps as tender offers
that must comply with SEC tender offer rules. "
C. Harms Caused by Market Sweeps
The courts' narrow interpretation of the definition of tender offer and
section 13(d)'s ineffective regulation of market sweeps have left a gap
through which acquirers may avoid the Williams Act's regulations.101
This lack of regulation increases the effectiveness of market sweeps,
thereby augmenting their attractiveness as a defensive or offensive tactic
in takeover situations.102 Unregulated market sweeps, however, cause
harms analogous to those inflicted by unregulated tender offers prior to
passage of the Williams Act.10 3
A purchaser may perform a market sweep without disclosing to share-
holders any information about his plans, identity, or financing,"° and he
may purchase shares on a first-come, first-served basis,' °" potentially ex-
cluding smaller shareholders, who may not know of the market sweep,
from participating in the transaction. 10 6 Shareholders who do know of
of the target company for purposes of acquiring control thereof," and second, "a subse-
quent rapid acquisition by the purchaser of large blocks of stock through open-market
and privately negotiated purchases." Idc at 1126-27.
99. The third test, employed by the court in Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448 (5th
Cir. 1986), classifies a market sweep as an unconventional tender offer when the solicitees
need the protections of the Williams Act in order to make an informed decision. See Id.
at 1454; see also Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (adopt-
ing the test); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 598 (5th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). This test is best labelled a "shareholder impact test." Note,
supra note 88, at 102; see also Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. I1. 1973) (definition of tender
offer should extend to offers with same impact as conventional tender offer).
100. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,473; see, eg., Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d
1448, 1454-55 (5th Cir. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir.
1985); SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d 945, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1985). But see
S-G Secs., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass. 1978) (acquisi-
tion of large blocks of stock following an announcement to gain control constituted a
tender offer); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251-52 (W.D. Okla.
1972) (active solicitation or personal contact with shareholders for purpose of purchasing
their shares constituted a tender offer).
101. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,476.
102. See Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 16,385, 18 SEC Docket 1092,
1093 (Nov. 29, 1979).
103. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,473, 37,476; infra notes 104-36 and accom-
panying text.
104. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,475; ef L. Loss, supra note 4, at 498 (bidder
may perform unregulated tender offer in secrecy); 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967) (statement
of Sen. Williams) (bidder in unregulated tender offer need not disclose any information
about his background, motives, or plans); supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text
(same).
105. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,475; cf H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11,
at 2812 (bidder in unregulated tender offer may purchase shares on first-come, first-
served basis); supra text accompanying note 34 (same).
106. During a market sweep, the purchaser typically buys from market professionals
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the market sweep must decide whether to sell or retain their shares with-
out knowing whether the purchaser plans to obtain a controlling interest
in the company, and, if so, what, if any, corporate changes he will insti-
tute.'o7 The lack of sufficient information,' 8 combined with the intense,
short-term nature of the market sweep,' 0 9 pressures these shareholders
into making quick, uninformed decisions." 0
The pressure market sweeps place on shareholders is functionally
equivalent to the pressure created by unregulated tender offers. If a
shareholder responds quickly to the offer to purchase, he might not gain
timely knowledge of the risks of his decision and cannot reverse his deci-
sion once his shares are sold.II A shareholder who sells his shares in a
market sweep may forfeit other options, including the possibility of ob-
taining a higher price that subsequently might be offered 1 2 or the chance
who hold large blocks of the target company's stock. See Federal Securities & Corporate
Developments, Close 10-Day Window to Stop Abuses from Open-Market Purchases, SEC
Told, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 2075 (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereafter Close 10-
day Window]; see, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Hanson acquired 25% of SCM's outstanding stock through five privately negotiated
cash purchases and one open-market purchase).
107. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,475.
108. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,476; cf H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11,
at 2812 (discussing the lack of information faced by shareholders during unregulated
tender offers); supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (same).
109. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC, 774 F.2d at 52 (Hanson acquired 3.1 million SCM
shares in two hours to obtain a 25% interest); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 598 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (Consolidated
Gold Fields, a white knight acting in cooperation with the target, purchased 15.8 million
Newmont shares in only two days).
110. See SEC to Propose Rules Aimed at Curbing Market Sweeps that Skirt Williams
Act, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1385 (Sept. 18, 1987) [hereafter Curbing
Market Sweeps]; cf H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2813 (discussing the pressure
and lack of information created by unregulated cash tender offers); supra notes 41-45 and
accompanying text (same).
Uninformed decisions violate fundamental economic principals of market efficiency.
Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 470, 472
(1969) (use of inside information by small number of investors creates biased decision-
making on behalf of other investors and fosters a persistent misallocation of economic
resources). Furthermore, creation of a securities market where all investors have an
equal opportunity to receive information, will reduce the volatility in market price swings
caused by low investor participation in the stock market, and increase allocative effi-
ciency. Seligman, The Reformation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic In-
formation, 73 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1117-18 (1985) (prominent reason for investor departure
from the market is widely held perception that institutional investors receive "inside in-
formation" that small investors did not).
111. Cf Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 597-98 (5th Cir.) (if a share-
holder responded to a tender offer prior to the Williams Act, "he might not learn in time
the true risks of his decision"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); H.R. Rep. No. 1711,
supra note 11, at 2812 (discussing similar harms inflicted by unregulated tender offers);
supra note 45 and accompanying text (same).
112. Often in a takeover battle, a tender offeror may have to raise the price being
offered either because another higher offer has been made or the price is not drawing
enough tenders. Betting the Store: Campeau at Last Gets Federated-Now Can He Make
a Go of It, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1988, at 10, col. 2 (R.H. Macy Co. and Campeau Corp.
made competing tender offers for Federated Stores which started with a $61 a share offer
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to support a new party in the takeover battle who better represents his
economic interests." 3 If the shareholder delays, he may foreclose the
option of obtaining the going price for his shares" 4 because the buyer
may purchase the desired number of shares from other shareholders." 5
In addition, shareholders may not be aware of the exact time pressure
they are under, because nobody-not even the purchaser-knows how
long it will take to obtain the desired number of shares.' 6
The first-come, first-served method of purchase used in market sweeps
results in the unequal treatment of shareholders as a class,"' thereby
frustrating one of the fundamental principles of the Williams Act."18
Arbitrageurs benefit most from the first-come, first-served method be-
cause their easy access to market information" 9 quickly provides them
with knowledge of large buy orders.' 20 This enables them to sell their
large blocks of stock while smaller shareholders, who often do not pos-
sess this knowledge, miss the opportunity to sell their shares.' 2 ' The
first-come, first-served method of purchase thus places nonprofessional
shareholders faced with a market sweep at a distinct disadvantage.
and ended with a $73.50 a share offier by Campeau); Morgan Stanley Raises Burlington
Bid To $78 a Share Topping Hostile Offer, Wall St. J., June 11, 1987, at 4, col. 2 (Morgan
Stanley raised tender offer to $78 a share, seeking to defeat Edelman-Dominion attempt
to acquire Burlington).
113. A shareholder may prefer to sell to the target company rather than to a raider
who wishes to collect greenmail, the premium price paid by a takeover target to a raider
for his shares in exchange for his promise not to pursue the takeover battle. When a
shareholder sells his shares to the purchaser, there is no opportunity to withdraw as there
is in a tender offer, see Williams Act, § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). See SEC
Release, supra note 24, at 37,475.
114. After a market sweep has been completed, the price of the stock tends to drop.
See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
115. Cf Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 598 (5th Cir.) (if a share-
holder waited to respond to a tender offer prior to the Williams Act, he risked losing his
opportunity to gain a premium price for his securities because others might already have
tendered to the offeror the number of shares he required), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 873
(1974); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2812 (discussing similar harms of unregu-
lated tender offers); supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
116. See, eg., SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1985)
(sweep completed in seven days); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d
585, 598 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (sweep completed in two days).
117. See Curbing Market Sweeps, supra note 110, at 1385; Blanc, supra note 8, at 29,
col. 3; cf H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2812 (first-come, first-served method of
purchasing in unregulated tender offers creates unequal treatment of shareholders); supra
note 45 and accompanying text (same).
118. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
119. Arbitrageurs, by monitoring the market through Quotrons and keeping track of
orders to buy or sell, are able to recognize a potential takeover battle at its inception. An
arbitrageur is a "person who endeavors to profit from offsetting long and short security
positions or from a disparity in market prices on different markets." A. Pessin & J. Ross,
Words of Wall Street: 2,000 Investment Terms Defined 13 (1983).
120. See L. Cohen, Despite SEC Opposition, "Street Sweeps" Don't Always Harm Small
Stockholders, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1987, at 33, col. I (explaining SEC's argument).
121. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474. But see L. Cohen, supra note 120, at
33, col. 1 (arguing small shareholders may remain unharmed by a market sweep).
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Although many smaller shareholders may gain a profit by selling their
shares to arbitrageurs, they still are denied the protections sought by the
Williams Act. First, many shareholders may sell their shares early in the
takeover battle, thereby foregoing larger returns if the bidding war esca-
lates. Second, many shareholders may not be able to participate in the
market sweep because they lack the knowledge and time to evaluate all
their options.
Market sweeps also disrupt the equal footing between competing par-
ties in a takeover battle122 that Congress found so important in drafting
the Williams Act.123 Market sweeps discourage further bidding through
tender offers, hurting not only bidders, but shareholders as well. 124 Mar-
ket sweeps "lock out" additional action by bidders already involved in
the takeover battle. 125 Because a person conducting a market sweep
purchases shares at market price, 126 parties who have made tender offers
terminate the offers rather than increase the premium price offered. 127
Moreover, the possibility of being undercut by a "free rider"'128 deters
bidders from launching tender offers. 129 For example, in a defensive
market sweep, 130 the target company repurchases its own shares on the
market, thereby introducing excessive uncertainty with respect to the
prospective success of an unsolicited tender offer.' 3' A defensive market
sweep not only ends the bidding by parties already involved in the battle,
but also deters other bidders from entering the battle. 132 An unsuccessful
tender offer is quite costly to the offeror due to the legal, advisory, and
122. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,475.
123. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
124. See Curbing Market Sweeps, supra note 110, at 1385 (statement of SEC Director,
Division of Corporation Finance, Linda Quinn).
125. See id.
126. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
127. See Curbing Market Sweeps, supra note 110, at 1385 (statement of SEC Director,
Division of Corporation Finance, Linda Quinn).
128. A free rider is a third party who takes advantage of the market environment to
effect a market sweep. The free rider may be a company that desires to make a bid for a
target company engaged in a takeover battle but refrains from making a tender offer and
effects the acquisition via a market sweep. The free rider may wait so as to ambush the
other bidders and possibly the target company with a quick, rapid accumulation of the
target company's stock. By doing this, the free rider may block any response from other
parties.
129. See Curbing Market Sweeps, supra note 110, at 1385-86 (statement of SEC Com-
missioner Joseph Grundfest).
130. A defensive market sweep is performed by a target company to preempt a take-
over. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,475.
131. See Note, supra note 49, at 537.
It has been argued that market sweeps serve as a mechanism to entrench management.
See id. at 552-53; see, e.g., SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir.
1985) (SEC accused Carter Hawley Hale of such tactics); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 600 (Del. Ch.) (Ivanhoe claimed that Newmont, aided and
abetted by Consolidated Gold Fields, violated its fiduciary obligation to Newmont share-
holders), aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
132. See Curbing Market Sweeps, supra note 110, at 1386 (statement of SEC Commis-
sioner Joseph Grundfest).
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printing expenses associated with launching a takeover bid. Further-
more, by blocking out other bidders, market sweeps deprive shareholders
of the possibility of obtaining the higher price other bidders might have
offered for their shares.1
33
Purchasers employing market sweeps enjoy additional advantages that
disrupt the balance between competing parties in a takeover battle. A
purchaser usually uses a market sweep to realize an element of surprise
against the target company and other bidders. 34 Without notice, other
parties to the battle cannot undertake appropriate defensive measures.
The purchaser also maintains the advantage of incurring lower costs in a
market sweep than he would have incurred in a tender offer, which typi-
cally entails greater attorneys' fees due to the required filings, greater
overhead costs, 35 and payment of a premium price for the shares.
136
While Congress primarily intended to protect shareholders in passing
the Williams Act, it also sought to ensure that the Act would not dis-
courage legitimate corporate takeover activity. 31 Congress believed that
corporations, shareholders, and employees could benefit highly from eco-
nomically sound mergers and acquisitions and therefore constructed the
Williams Act to further such beneficial activity. 3 '
Market sweeps impose harms on parties in a takeover battle analogous
to those imposed on parties affected by unregulated tender offers. 139
Although section 14(d) of the Williams Act eliminated the harms caused
by unregulated tender offers, ' the current use of market sweeps enables
parties to bypass section 14(d)'s regulations.' 4 ' Indeed, court decisions
refusing to impose the regulating scheme of section 14(d) on market
133. See id. at 1385 (statement of SEC Director, Division of Corporation Finance,
Linda Quinn). The SEC found that investors often received between one and two dollars
per share less when selling their shares after a completed market sweep. See id Exempli-
fying this, Consolidated Gold's market sweep locked out Ivanhoe's tender offer for S105
per share by purchasing shares at prices between S95 and 599 per share, preventing share-
holders from getting the highest price possible. See Gold Fields Increases Its Newmont
Stake To Nearly 50%, Appears to Foil Pickens, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1987, at 3, 17, col. 1.
Only three months later, the stock was trading in the mid-thirties after a S33 dividend,
giving the stock an adjusted value in the mid-sixties. See Compuserve Inc., Database
(March 5, 1988).
134. See Note, supra note 88, at I 11; cf L. Loss, supra note 4, at 498 (in an unregu-
lated tender offer, "secrecy enable[s] [the offeror] to catch the management by surprise").
135. Overhead costs include printer's fees, overtime pay, and postal charges.
136. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474; Curbing Market Sweeps, supra note
110, at 1385. The party performing a market sweep need not pay as high a premium
because the seller in the market sweep receives cash up front, whereas a person who
tenders may receive a combination of cash and securities and must wait until at least after
the minimum tender offer period has elapsed.
137. See 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
138. See id.
139. Compare supra notes 104-36 and accompanying text (harms inflicted by market
sweeps) with supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (harms inflicted by unregulated
tender offers).
140. See supra notes 51-69 and accompanying text.
141. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,475.
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sweeps 14 2 provide examples, which if followed, set precedents that endan-
ger those goals established by the Williams Act.'4 3 Parties wishing to
gain a controlling interest in a company will employ market sweeps al-
most exclusively, leaving the tender offer regulations useless, just as
tender offers became a popular way to avoid proxy regulations during the
1960's. Market sweeps, therefore, must be regulated. Because courts are
unwilling to apply section 14(d) of the Williams Act to market sweeps,
"remedial administrative or legislative action [is] necessary."' 44
III. REGULATION OF MARKET SWEEPS
A. Recent SEC Proposal
The SEC has decided that the time to allow the courts to deal with the
growing problems caused by today's frequent and high-priced merger
battles has passed.' 45 Therefore, the SEC has proposed Rules 13e-2, 14d-
11 (a), and 14d-l1 (b) to regulate market sweeps by applying the tender
offer provisions of the Williams Act to them. 146 These proposed rules
142. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 47-77 and accompanying text.
144. See Tyson, supra note 60, at 40.
145. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474.
146. See id.
On several previous occasions, the SEC and Congress have attempted to solve the
problems created by market sweeps. All such attempts, however, have failed. In 1979,
the SEC proposed Rules 14d-l(b)(1) and 14e-5, see Exchange Act, Release No. 34-
16,385, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349-57 (1979), to bring certain market sweeps within the classifi-
cation of tender offers. Proposed Rule 14d-l(b)(1) defined a tender offer as either (1) one
or more offers to purchase or solicitations of offers to purchase the same class of securities
during a 45-day period directed to more than 5% of the class of securities, or (2) wide
dissemination of offers to purchase or solicitations of offers to sell at a premium price
when there is no possible opportunity to negotiate the terms of the offer. See id. at
70,350-51. Proposed Rule 14e-5 permitted a tender offeror to purchase the target com-
pany's securities only by means of the tender offer. This restriction remained in effect
through the tenth business day after the offer's termination. See id. at 70,357. The SEC
chose not to adopt either of these proposed rules.
In 1980, an SEC report submitted to Congress suggested changes in the Williams Act,
including a modification of § 13(d) to require persons acquiring 5% ownership of a class
of securities to announce publicly, within one business day, their identity, percentage of
ownership, and other relevant information. See Securities and Exchange Commission
Report on Tender Offer Laws, Printed for the Use of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs 84-85 (Comm. Print 1980); Note, supra note 88, at 119 &
n.157. Congress declined to enact these changes.
In a final report issued on July 8, 1983, the SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers
recommended that any accumulation of greater than 20% of an issuer's voting securities
be made pursuant to a tender offer to all shareholders, unless purchased directly from the
issuer. See Securities & Exchange Commission Advisory Comm. on Tender Offers, Re-
port of Recommendations 21-23 (1983); Note, supra note 88, at 121-22. The SEC also
recommended that a prospective purchaser be required to disclose its ownership and in-
tentions at least 48 hours prior to acquiring greater than 5% of a company's outstanding
shares. See Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Comm. on Tender Offers,
Report of Recommendations 21-23 (1983); Note, supra note 88, at 121 & n.166. Once
again Congress declined to follow the Commission's suggestions.
In addition, Congress considered two bills designed to eliminate abuses associated with
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will prevent the harms caused by market sweeps by giving shareholders
needed protections and restoring a balance between the parties in a take-
over battle.
Proposed Rules 14d- 11(a) and 14d-11(b) apply to any person wishing
to acquire shares for which a tender offer has been commenced or an-
nounced publicly, 47 whereas Rule 13e-2 applies specifically to issuers. 14 8
Together, proposed Rules 13e-2149 and 14d-1 l(a) t5 require, with certain
large, open-market and privately negotiated purchases, including market sweeps. See
The Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984, Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange
Commission Regarding H.R. 5693, As Amended and Ordered Reported by the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, reprinted in H.. Rep. 1028, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 34
(1984); S. 1907, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S17098 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1985).
The 1984 bill, proposed by Representative Wirth of Colorado, required that a disclosure
document be filed within 24 hours of the acquisition of over 5% of an issuer's outstanding
voting securities and prohibited additional purchases until 48 hours had elapsed after the
filing of the document. See H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 202, reprinted in H.R. Rep.
1028, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1984); Note, supra note 88, at 121-22; see also L Loss,
supra note 4, at 540 (discussing the 1984 bill). In September 1984, the Commission op-
posed the bill but encouraged further work on this type of bill. See Memorandum of the
Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding H.P. 5693, As Amended and Ordered
Reported by the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, reprinted in H.R. Rep. 1028,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1984); Note, supra note 88, at 121-22.
In 1985, Congress considered the Tender Offer Reform Act of 1985, proposed by Sena-
tor D'Amato of New York, S. 1907, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S17098 (daily
ed. Dec. 6, 1985), which required a person acquiring more than 5% of a class of stock to
announce that fact and to file a Schedule 13(D) within a 24 hour period of the purchase
and prohibited the purchaser from acquiring additional shares of that class for the 48
hours following the "triggering purchase." See id; Note, supra note 88, at 123. The bill
also would have regulated many currently unregulated acquisition programs, subjecting
them to the Williams Act's tender offer provisions. See S. 1907, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131
Cong. Rec. S17098 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1985); Note, supra note 88, at 124-25. The bill,
however, did not pass.
Currently the House and Senate are discussing several other statutory amendments to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate market sweeps. See S. 1324, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a)(3)(B) (1987); S. 1323, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 7(b)(5)(A)-(B)
(1987); H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 103(2)(A)-(B) (1987); H.R. 2172, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 14(i)(2)(A) (1987). Each prohibits a bidder from terminating a tender
offer and immediately acquiring securities of the same class and "require[s] all acquisi-
tions above a certain threshold of ownership to proceed by way of conventional tender
offer." See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474 & n.6.
Enactment by Congress of the House bills is not imminent because each must undergo
extensive refinement. See Sarasohn, In The House: Preemption Battle Looms, American
Lawyer, Dec. 1987, at 22 (quoting N. Anderson, a partner at Sullivan & Cromwell);
Sarasohn, Proxmire Plan: Putting the Arm on Raiders, American Lawyer, Dec. 1987, at
12. The outlook for Senate legislation is uncertain. Id
147. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,482.
148. See id at 37,481.
149. Proposed Rule 13e-2(a) provides in pertinent part:
Upon commencement of an issuer tender offer pursuant to Rule 13e-4(a)(4) ...
until the expiration of ten business days after the scheduled expiration date of
such tender offer, including any extensions thereof, the issuer shall not, directly
or indirectly, purchase, offer to purchase, make any arrangement or under-
standing to purchase, or solicit any offer to sell either an aggregate of ten per-
cent or more of securities of a class that is or was subject to such tender offer or
securities of a class which are convertible into, exchangeable for, or otherwise
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exceptions, that after commencement of a tender offer, all purchases of
ten percent or more of the securities of a particular corporation by any
person during the offer and for the ten business days immediately follow-
ing its termination, shall be made in compliance with the the tender offer
requirements.15 '
The SEC chose a ten-day cooling-off period because it believed such a
time period sufficient to allow the "market dynamics"' 52 of a takeover
battle to settle. 53 The ten percent threshold attempts to protect against
the accumulation of a target company's stock during a takeover situa-
tion154, while minimizing the regulations' effect on normal arbitrage ac-
tivity.155 The SEC concluded that regulation at a lower threshold might
interfere with such free market activity.' 56
Proposed Rule 14d-1 1(b)157 requires a bidder who publicly announces
give any right or privilege to, an aggregate of ten percent or more of securities of
a class that is or was subject to such tender offer unless the purchase, offer to
purchase, arrangement or understanding to purchase or solicitation of any offer
to sell is made pursuant to Rule 13e-4 ....
SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,481.
Section 13e-2(b) provides similar regulation of acquisitions and related activities by any
affiliate of the issuer after commencement of a tender offer. See id. Section 13e-2(c)
outlines purchases not subject to these provisions. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at
37,481-82; infra notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
150. Proposed Rule 14d- 1(a) provides in pertinent part:
Upon commencement of an issuer tender offer pursuant to Rule 13e-4(a)(4)...
until the expiration of ten business days after the scheduled expiration date of
such tender offer, including any extension thereof, no person shall, directly or
indirectly, purchase, offer to purchase, make any arrangement or understanding
to purchase, or solicit any offer to sell any security that would increase any
person's beneficial ownership of securities of a class that is or was subject to the
tender offer by an aggregate of ten percent or more of that class, unless the
purchase, offer to purchase, arrangement or understanding to purchase or solic-
itation of any offer to sell is made pursuant to section 14(d) of the Act and the
rules promulgated thereunder.
SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,482.
151. See id. at 37,473; Blanc, supra note 8, at 28.
152. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
153. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,477.
154. See id.
155. Most arbitrageurs do not purchase more than 10% of a target company's stock.
See id.
156. See id.
157. Proposed Rule 14d-1 l(b) provides in pertinent part:
Upon commencement of a tender offer by public announcement pursuant to
Rule 14d-2(b) . . . and until either-
(1) The bidder commences the tender offer by means other than such public
announcement or
(2) The expiration of 30 business days after the date that the bidder makes a
public announcement pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b)(1)... that it will not continue
with such tender offer, whichever occurs first, the bidder shall not, directly or
indirectly, purchase, offer to purchase, make any arrangement or understanding
to purchase, or solicit any offer to sell any security that would increase any
person's beneficial ownership of securities of a class that is or was subject to the
tender offer by an aggregate of ten percent or more of that class, unless the
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plans to commence a tender offer to comply with the tender offer regula-
tions set forth by the Williams Act for thirty business days after termina-
tion of the offer once that bidder purchases more than ten percent of the
outstanding securities of the target company.158 Proposal of this section
is based on the SEC's belief that public announcements of tender offers
have the same effect on the market for the subject securities as do com-
mencements of tender offers. 159 Under proposed Rule 14d- 1 (b), if a bid-
der announces a tender offer and thereafter decides not to commence it,
he still remains subject to the twenty-day minimum offering period appli-
cable to tender offers"6° and the ten-day "cooling-off" period established
by proposed Rules 14d-11(a) and 13e-2.11" Proposed Rules 13e-2, 14d-
1 (a), and 14d-11 (b) thus prevent any party involved in a takeover battle
from taking advantage of the market dynamics caused by a public an-
nouncement or commencement of a tender offer 62 by performing a mar-
ket sweep and bypassing the Williams Act's regulations.1 63
The proposed rules, however, exclude from the ten percent limit shares
purchased through any of five specified arrangements. The proposal ex-
empts purchases that include blocks of more than five percent of a com-
pany's outstanding securities where the beneficial ownership of the
securities had been reported for at least one year.16 Because the benefi-
cial owner did not assemble the block in reaction to, or in anticipation of,
a tender offer, the transaction does not pose the same risk to shareholders
that a market sweep does.1 65
The proposal also excludes from regulation "purchases pursuant to a
binding contract between the purchaser and owner of the securities en-
tered into prior to the announcement of a tender offer." 166 Requiring the
seller to own the securities at the time of the contract and requiring the
contract terms to be fixed 67 eliminates any risk to shareholders con-
fronting a market sweep.168
The third and fourth exceptions encompass situations in which share-
purchase, offer to purchase, arrangement or understanding to purchase or solic-
itation of any offer to sell is made pursuant to section 14(d) of the Act and the
rules promulgated thereunder.
Id. at 37,482. Section 14d-I 1(c) enumerates purchases not subject to section 14d- I I regu-
lation. See id; infra notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
158. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,478.
159. See iL at 37,476; see also supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1987); see supra note 59.
161. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,478.
162. See supra notes 85-86, 119-21 and accompanying text.
163. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,476.
164. Id at 37,478.
165. The SEC believes that unless the purchases are in reaction to a tender offer, share-
holders suffer no disadvantage. See id
166. Iad
167. See id.
168. See id.
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holder approval is necessary before the transaction occurs.1 69 The pro-
posed rules exclude purchases by issuers pursuant to securityholder
approval, including repurchase plans, reorganizations, and recapitaliza-
tions that do not constitute a tender offer. 170 The proposed rules also
exclude purchases in connection with a merger or consolidation of the
issuer that require prior shareholder approval. 17'
The final exception excludes purchases from an issuer 72 because these
purchases do not affect the market or securityholders in the same detri-
mental manner as market sweeps do.17 3
B. Arguments In Favor of the Proposal
The strong analogy between the harms wrought by market sweeps and
those caused by unregulated tender offers prior to enactment of the Wil-
liams Act 1 74 supports the application of section 14(d) of the Act to mar-
ket sweeps.' 75 Proposed Rules 13e-2, 14d-11(a), and 14d-11(b) subject
market sweeps to the tender offer provisions of the Williams Act, 176
thereby eliminating the time pressure on, and lack of information faced
by, shareholders. 77 Application of section 14(d) of the Williams Act 78
will provide shareholders with adequate time and the information neces-
sary to make a rational decision whether to sell their shares in a market
sweep. 179 In addition, the proposed rules prevent unequal treatment of
shareholders8 ° by requiring the purchase of shares to be prorated' 81 and
169. The SEC believes, in these cases, that shareholder protection is provided even in
the absence of the proposed rules. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. The issuer in a takeover battle is the target company.
173. See id.
174. Compare supra notes 104-36 and accompanying text (harms of market sweeps)
with supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (harms of tender offers).
175. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,475.
176. See supra notes 146-63 and accompanying text.
177. Cf H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2813-15 (stating that application of
§§ 14(d)(1) and 14(d)(5) through 14(d)(7) to tender offers provide the information needed
by shareholders); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1987) (requiring a tender offer remain open for
20 business days); supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text (noting that tender offer
provisions reduce time pressure and lack of information faced by shareholders).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
179. Cf supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (§ 14(d) provides shareholders ade-
quate time and sufficient information necessary to make a rational decision whether to
tender their shares in a tender offer). In the absence of the proposed rules, Consolidated
Gold Fields purchased an additional 23.5% of Newmont's outstanding stock during
Ivanhoe's tender offer in only two days. Gold Fields Wins Approval to Keep Stake in
Newmont, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1987, at 43, col. 1. Under the proposed rules, this would
not have been possible. The filing requirement would have compelled Consolidated Gold
Fields to provide the shareholders with adequate information, which takes time and
removes the advantage of surprise, thereby eliminating the possibility of a two-day mar-
ket sweep.
180. Cf supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (§ 14(d) ensures equal treatment of
shareholders in a tender offer).
181. The proposed rules subject market sweeps to § 14(d)(6) of the Williams Act,
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the price received by each shareholder participating in the market sweep
to be the same.
182
In addition to eliminating harms similar to those inflicted by unregu-
lated tender offers, the proposed rules provide a solution for problems
unique to market sweeps. By placing management in the same position
as tender offerors and requiring them to meet section 14(d) require-
ments,18 3 the proposal would reduce management's use of market sweeps
to entrench itself, an act that reduces shareholder value."S Furthermore,
by ensuring that all parties comply with existing tender offer regula-
tions,' 5 the proposal maintains the equal balance intended by the Wil-
liams Act among target companies, raiders, and third parties. 8 6 By
maintaining this equal balance, the proposal encourages auctioning of
companies because it prevents the "locking out" of potential bidders
through quick, preemptive market sweeps.18 7
C. Arguments Against the Proposal
One argument favoring nonregulation of market sweeps is based, in
part, on the assumption that regulation of market sweeps will tamper
with the free market.1 88 This free market argument asserts that open-
market transactions involve willing buyers and sellers who should be free
from any governmental interference.189 This view, however, fails to ap-
preciate that the proposal effectively remedies the harms of market
sweeps without overregulating open-market and privately negotiated
which requires the bidder in a tender offer to purchase tendered shares on a pro rata
basis, see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474.
182. The proposed rules subject market sweeps to § 14(d)(7) of the Williams Act,
which mandates that all tendering shareholders receive the same price for their shares,
see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982). See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474. If the SEC
proposal had predated the battle for Newmont, see Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 533 A.2d 585 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987), investors, small and
large alike, would have had the opportunity to participate in the market sweep, receiving
the same price as the "large block" holders (most likely arbitrageurs), without being
closed out merely because the purchaser could obtain the desired number of shares more
quickly and easily from these "large block" holders.
183. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982); SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,476.
184. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (discussing management entrench-
ment as a harm caused by market sweeps).
185. See Blanc, supra note 8, at 29, col. 3.
For example, in Ivanhoe Partners. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585 (Del. Ch.),
aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987), if Consolidated Gold had been forced to meet the
Williams Act tender offer requirements, it would have been placed on equal footing with
Ivanhoe, depriving Consolidated Gold of the added time, lower cost, and surprise they
needed to defeat the competition.
186. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' desire, when
drafting the Williams Act, not to tip the balance between the tender offeror and the target
company).
187. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
188. See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1985).
189. See Close JO-Day Window, supra note 106, at 2075-76 (statement of Arthur
Fleischer of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson).
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purchases.1 90
Proponents of this argument rigidly insist on applying old law to a new
environment. Extension of Williams Act provisions to market sweeps
would not interfere with the open market. Congress intended by passing
the Williams Act to regulate substantial purchases of stock that pres-
sured shareholders. 9 1 In doing so, Congress differentiated between
tender offers, which are regulated by 14(d), and open-market and pri-
vately negotiated transactions, which are regulated by 13(d).1 92 At the
time of enactment, market sweeps rarely were practiced and therefore
Congress did not consider this type of transaction when drafting the
Act's provisions. Today, however, the availability of large amounts of
capital through junk bond financing" makes market sweeps a viable
method for acquiring controlling blocks of stock.' 94 The proposed rules,
by regulating market sweeps, would be doing, in effect, no more than the
Williams Act sought to do. The proposed rules would not interfere with
the open-market transactions Congress chose not to regulate, but would
regulate only transactions often used as substitutes for tender offers.
Market sweeps obstruct the free market by fo.rcing uninformed inves-
tors either to sell at an early stage or to risk lower profits or even loss
when a bidder is scared off or prevented from continuing his bid for a
company. Thus, by regulating market sweeps, the SEC's proposed rules
actually would preserve the free market.195 A free market-an environ-
ment in which buyers and sellers make consumption decisions based
upon perfect information' 96-- cannot exist when participating parties are
uninformed.
The proposed rules do not prohibit all open-market purchases; they
only regulate those large-block purchases undertaken after a tender offer
has been commenced by a party in a takeover battle and after ten percent
of the securities of the target company have been acquired. 197 Further-
more, the rules do not prevent acquisition of stock; they merely guaran-
190. The SEC, when writing the proposed rules, guarded against overregulating by
setting the 10% threshold, establishing the 10 day "cooling-off" period, and providing 5
exceptions to the rules. See generally SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,476-78.
191. See supra notes 51-72 and accompanying text.
192. See 113 Cong. Rec. 854-56 (1967) (statement by Sen. Williams); see also Hanson
Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 59 (2d Cir. 1985); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities
Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783,
817-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069
(1983).
193. Junk bonds, see supra note 4, often are issued to raise money needed to finance
takeover battles, including market sweeps. See J. Downes & J. Goodman, Dictionary of
Finance and Investment Terms 199 (2d ed. 1987).
194. See Roundtable: The Mergers and Acquisitions Outlook for 1987, Mergers & Ac-
quisitions, May/June 1987, at 44.
195. See Curbing Market Sweeps, supra note 110, at 1385; see also supra notes 117-33
and accompanying text.
196. W. Nicholson, Intermediate Microeconomics and Its Application 572 (3d ed.
1983).
197. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474.
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tee that in a hostile takeover context, acquisitions will be made in
compliance with the Williams Act."'8 Finally, the proposal only delays
block purchases; no significant interference with securities transactions
occurs.
19 9
A second argument against the SEC proposal challenges the effective-
ness of the rules in promoting the interest of the target company's share-
holders."° SEC Chief Economist Kenneth Lehn claims that a "cooling-
off" period of ten days may only delay, not prevent, a market sweep.20°
Mr. Lehn's argument, although true, loses sight of the proposed rules'
purpose. That purpose is not to prevent market sweeps, but rather to
protect shareholders by providing them with the time and information
necessary to react to a large offer to purchase shares of a target company
by a party seeking corporate control.2 °2 Furthermore, the delay, while
protecting shareholders, minimizes the resulting interference with the
free market.20 3
Mr. Lehn also suggests that market sweeps occur so rarely that a case-
by-case analysis of each transaction provides a superior approach.2°
Market sweeps in fact are prevalent and are likely to increase if they
remain uncontrolled. 20 ' A uniform regulation applicable to all market
sweeps would lend predictability to the requirements and thereby guide
the manner in which large, open-market purchases are made. A case-by-
case approach, therefore, would not provide adequate regulation. Pre-
emptive, rather than remedial, regulation is necessary because once a
market sweep occurs, the damage is irreparable. 6
Another argument denying the need for regulation is that market
sweeps typically involve professional market arbitrageurs who do not
need protection because they are sophisticated, informed investors.0 7
This argument fails for two reasons. First, it ignores the harm done to
smaller investors left out of market sweeps altogether. 08 Second, share-
holders who participate in market sweeps, as well as those who do not,
198. See id. at 37,473-74.
199. See id. at 37,475.
200. See Curbing Market Sweeps, supra note 110, at 1385 (statement by SEC Chief
Economist Kenneth Lehn).
201. See id. at 1384.
202. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474; supra notes 51-72 and accompanying
text.
203. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474; supra notes 152-56 and accompanying
text.
204. See Curbing Market Sweeps, supra note 110, at 1385.
205. See Close 1O-Day Window, supra note 106, at 2075 (citing Martin Lipton of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz).
206. See, eg., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 600, 610
(Del. Ch.) (the court and Newmont agreed that the harms caused by the Consolidated
Gold street sweep were irreparable), aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
207. See Close 10-Day Window, supra note 106, at 2075; see. e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v.
SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
208. Market sweeps involve purchases from a small number of shareholders. See SEC
Release, supra note 24, at 37,474.
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need the protections provided by the SEC's proposed rules because the
rules provide shareholders with the time and information necessary to
make a proper decision whether even to participate in the sweep.20 9
Even arbitrageurs need information and time to apply their skills.210 The
proposed rules guarantee that both arbitrageurs and smaller investors are
provided with the information necessary to make an intelligent decision
by requiring the purchaser using a market sweep to meet the disclosure
provisions of section 14(d)(1). 211
A final argument can be made that the SEC would exceed its rule-
making authority by adopting the proposed rules. Such a view rests on
two premises. First, as a matter of law, if market sweeps are not tender
offers,21 2 as many courts have held,213 then the SEC has no authority to
regulate such transactions under section 14(d) of the Williams Act. Sec-
ond, Congress left open-market purchases unregulated because it be-
lieved such action to be unnecessarily intrusive into the securities
market.214 Thus, regulating market sweeps would run directly contrary
to Congress' intent.
Although such an objection ultimately is a matter for the courts, many
sound reasons support the view that the SEC's rule-making authority
should include market sweeps. First, the SEC has authority to "define
technical, trade, accounting or other terms used in [the Securities Ex-
change Act] consistently with the provisions and purposes of this chap-
ter." 215 In proposing rules to regulate market sweeps, the SEC is in effect
using its authority to define the meaning of the term "tender offer,"'216
purposely left undefined in the Williams Act.217 The SEC has taken the
position that market sweeps conducted during or soon after a tender offer
create "the same pressures on, and unfair treatment of, shareholders that
the Williams Act" intended to alleviate and, therefore, should be consid-
ered unconventional tender offers.21 8 In the SEC's view, a market sweep
and a conventional tender offer differ only in the procedures undertaken
to implement each takeover method, but are the same in their purpose
and effect. 2 9 Therefore, the SEC is proposing rules that would in effect
209. See supra note 179.
210. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682
F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
211. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,476; cf 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982) (dis-
closure requirements for tender offers provide the information for all interested
stockholders).
212. For a discussion of whether market sweeps are tender offers, see generally Jupiter,
An Analysis of Efforts to Avoid Williams Act Requirements, 9 Sec. Reg. L.J. 259 (1981);
Tyson, The Williams Act After Hanson Trust v. SCM Corporation: Post-Tender Offer
Purchases by the Tender Offeror, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1986); Note, supra note 49.
213. See supra sources at note 100.
214. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1982).
216. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,481.
217. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
218. SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,475.
219. See id.
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categorize market sweeps under tender offer provisions.
Second, the 1934 Act gives the SEC general rule-making authority to
adopt "rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to im-
plement the provisions of [the Act]."22 The Supreme Court, in Mourn-
ing v. Family Publications Service,22" ' held that a rule enacted pursuant to
a general rule-making authority need only be "reasonably related to the
purposes of the enabling legislation" in order to be sustained.' In pro-
posing the rules regulating market sweeps, the SEC is attempting to ad-
vance the goals of the Williams Act, which include providing
shareholders with proper information, sufficient time, and equal opportu-
nity to make important investment decisions.223 Not only are the aims of
the proposal reasonably related to those of the Williams Act; they are, in
fact, identical.22z
The third justification for SEC action is found in the Williams Act. In
passing the Williams Act, Congress granted the SEC broad powers to
regulate disclosure with respect to large-scale accumulations of stock," 5
third party tender offers,22 6 and issuer purchases.227 Congress provided
that the SEC may act when it is "necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."" 8 The SEC is proposing the
market sweep rules because shareholders are being denied the protections
afforded by the Williams Act.
Although Congress, in passing the Williams Act, distinguished be-
tween tender offers and open-market purchases,1 9 it is not clear that it
intended to leave market sweeps conducted during or immediately after a
tender offer, which adversely affect target company shareholders, unreg-
ulated230 . The broad argument against the SEC's rule-making authority
is weakened to the extent that the SEC is not proposing to regulate all
open-market purchases, nor is it promulgating general corporate law
220. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1982).
221. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
222. Id at 369 (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81
(1969)).
223. See supra notes 47-77 and accompanying text.
224. Compare supra notes 47-77 and accompanying text with supra notes 174-87 and
accompanying text.
The SEC previously has used this broad authority to modify significantly the reach of
the Williams Act. The SEC promulgated Rule 13e-4 that, in effect, applies the Williams
Act's requirements to issuer tender offers. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1987) with 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982). This regulation survives today even though § 14(d)(8)(B) of the
Williams Act exempts "any offer for, or request or invitation for tenders of, any security
... by the issuer of such security." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8)(B) (1982). The SEC's market
sweep proposal is not as bold an amendment to the Williams Act as Rule 13e-4 was.
225. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
227. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1) (1982); see Note, SEC Takeover Regulation Under the Wl-
liams Act, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 580, 585 (1987).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982); see SEC Takeover Regulation, supra note 227, at
585.
229. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 101-44 and accompanying text.
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governing corporate takeover practices. The focus of the current SEC
market sweep proposal is limited to takeover situations involving uncon-
ventional tender offer techniques231 and is therefore a legitimate applica-
tion of the reach and goals of the Williams Act.
D. Suggested Modifications of the Recent SEC Proposal
The SEC's proposed rules allow a beneficial owner to sell his shares if
they were reported as beneficially owned one year prior to announcement
or commencement of a tender offer.2 32 Under this exception, a third
party who beneficially owns a large block of stock may, during a takeover
battle, sell his shares to any party involved, potentially giving the pur-
chaser a controlling interest in the target company.233 Such a transaction
would upset the balance among all parties involved in a takeover battle,
frustrating the intentions of the Williams Act.
Effective market sweep regulation should not allow a beneficial owner
to sell his block of stock to the issuer or to any party involved in a take-
over battle unless the purchaser meets the tender offer requirements of
the Williams Act or a majority of the shareholders approve the transac-
tion. One of the primary dangers created by market sweeps is that
smaller shareholders do not have the same opportunity to participate in a
market sweep as an arbitrageur or some other larger shareholder has.234
Large blocks of stock are more attractive to a bidder because he can
purchase a substantial portion of a target company's stock in relatively
few transactions. Thus, the SEC proposal seeks to regulate market
sweeps so as to provide equal treatment of shareholders. 235 To allow a
large beneficial shareholder to sell his block to a third party bidder or to
the issuer would hinder accomplishment of the proposal's goals because
smaller shareholders will be at a relative disadvantage with respect to the
beneficial shareholder during the course of the takeover.
Furthermore, the proposal's exception excluding from regulation
purchases from an issuer2 36 hinders achievement of the proposed rules'
goals.23 7 Under this exception, a purchaser buying a block of securities
231. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,481-82.
232. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
233. For example, in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585 (Del.
Ch.), aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987), Consolidated Gold, as beneficial owner of shares
during the takeover battle, could have sold its shares to Newmont Mining in order to
defeat Ivanhoe.
234. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
236. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,481-82; supra note 172-73 and accompany-
ing text.
237. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,474. Three of the four bills currently pend-
ing before the House and the Senate, see supra note 146, forbid any kind of security
issuance through which the purchaser gains an interest greater than 10% in the target
company. See S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a)(3)(B) (1987) (a 10% interest); H.R.
2668, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 103(2)(A)-(B) (1987) (a 5% interest as provided in
§ 101(a)); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14(i)(2)(A) (1987) (a 5% interest as pro-
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from an issuer escapes the requirements of proposed Rule 14d- 11 even
though a tender offer has been announced publicly or commenced. 238 An
issuer may take advantage of this exception by selling or issuing a large
block of common stock or some form of convertible or exchangeable se-
curity to a white knight in order to give the white knight a controlling
interest in the target company.239 This option permits an issuer working
with a white knight to defeat a hostile raider.2" Although this transac-
tion is not a conventional tender offer, the SEC should restrict it because
it has the same adverse impact on shareholders that market sweeps have.
This type of transaction frustrates the purpose of the proposed rules,
tipping the balance between the parties in the takeover battle and failing
to notify shareholders of the issuer's plan of action. This exception to
proposed Rule 14d-11 must be eliminated if the rules are to alleviate the
harms generated by market sweeps. Indeed, language specifically includ-
ing "any purchase, offer to purchase, arrangement or understanding to
purchase or solicitation of any offer to sell that relates to a purchase or
potential purchase from an issuer" should be added to proposed Rule
14d- 11. This additional language would prevent an issuer, after a tender
offer is publicly announced or commenced, from performing a defensive
sale or issuance of common stock or convertible or exchangeable securi-
ties to a white knight in order to defeat a hostile raider. This provision
also would further the goals of the proposed rules, providing fair and
equal treatment to shareholders and maintaining the balance between
competing parties in a takeover battle, without unduly interfering with
the free market.
CONCLUSION
Today's volatile environment of mergers and acquisitions has spurred
the increasing use of market sweeps to gain control of corporations.
Market sweeps create harms analogous to the harms generated by unreg-
ulated tender offers prevalent in the 1960's, prior to enactment of the
vided in § 4(a)). But see S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b)(5)(A)-(B) (1987) (a 25%
interest).
238. See SEC Release, supra note 24, at 37,478, 37,482.
239. This type of sale has been employed as a defensive tactic. See, eg., SEC v. Carter
Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d 945, 946 (9th Cir. 1985) (Carter Hawley Hale sold 1 mil-
lion shares of convertible preferred stock, composing 22% of the total voting power, to
General Cinema for $300 million); Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 724
(5th Cir. 1984) (upholding authorization of subordinated debentures and accompanying
warrants to purchase Gearhart shares designed to be exercisable by the debenture holders
at a lower price in the event a change of control occurred); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston
Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 850 (D. Minn. 1986) (upholding Gelco's defensive sale of a
block of 3 million preferred shares to Merrill Lynch).
240. See eg., Solomon, Limited Ends Its Offer for Carter Hawley But Says Control of
Retailer Is Still a Goal, Wall St. J., May 22, 1984, at 2, col. 3; Gearhart Sells Stock
Ending Takeover Bid By Smith International, Wall St. J., May 29, 1985, at 26, col. 3;
Coniston Partners End Takeover Bid For Gelco Corp., Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1986, at 4, col.
2.
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Williams Act. Because the SEC's proposed Rules 13e-2, 14d- 11(a), and
14d-11(b) eliminate the harms caused by market sweeps in the same
manner that the Williams Act eliminates the harms caused by unregu-
lated tender offers, they should be adopted with some minor alterations.
Failure to adopt these proposals will further encourage the use of market
sweeps to bypass the requirements of the Williams Act. The proposed
rules provide the regulation necessary to create a fair and open market-
place in which the shareholders of corporate America may invest their
time and money.
Maureen F Baker
